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Few Throats to Choke:
On the Current Structure of the Internet
Abstract—The original design of the Internet was as a resilient,
distributed system, able to route around (and therefore recover
from) massive disruption - up to and including nuclear war.
However, network effects and business decisions (e.g. the purchase of GlobalCrossing by Level-3) have led to centralization
of routing power. This is not merely an academic issue; it has
practical implications, such as whether the citizens of a country
may be subject to censorship by an “upstream” ISP in some
other country, that controls its entire access to the Internet.
In this paper, we examine the extent of routing centralization in
the Internet; identify the major players who control the “Internet
backbone”; and point out how many these are, in fact, under
the jurisdiction of censorious countries. We also measure the
collateral damage caused by censorship, particularly by the two
largest Internet-using nations, China and India.

I. I NTRODUCTION
The Internet, as originally mandated by DARPA, is a
telecommunication network that can survive tremendous damage. As a packet-switching network, it does not require centralized control; catastrophic damage to one part of the network
is simply routed around.
However, in practice, the Internet is not a flat network.
It consists of a large number (currently about 55,000) of
networks, called Autonomous Systems or ASes, which mostly
keep their internal structure a black box and enter into
relationships (as customers, peers, or providers) with other
ASes to forward each others’ traffic. The existence of such
relationships is a constraint on the paths followed by traffic.
For example, if ASes A and B are both providers to AS X,
then X will refuse to carry transit traffic from A to B (or B
to A).
One consequence of such structure, pointed out by
Shmatikov [1], is that individuals, companies, and even nations have very limited control over their connectivity to the
Internet. Even in the case of China, the world’s largest nation
by number of Internet users (720 million) [2], and connected
to over 850 ASes which are happy to carry its traffic, choosing
to avoid just 2% of world ASes leads to massive and costly
disruption.
1) 44 ASes in China have to start functioning as transit
ASes. (China has only 30 transit ASes, so this is an
increase of ≈ 150%.
2) The effective latency seen by the Chinese user increases
by a factor of 8.
In conjunction with observing how a small number
of randomly-chosen Autonomous Systems has a surprising
amount of power, we also note that not all Autonomous
Systems are equal. In the 2001 study by Rexford and Katz [3],
the Internet is demonstrated to be a hierarchy of five levels.
1) Dense Core. (≈ 20 ASes. Tier-1 providers, nearly a
clique)

2) Transit Core. (162 ASes. Mostly peer with dense core
or each other)
3) Outer Core. (675 ASes. Not all closely connected)
4) Small Regional ISPs. (950 ASes. Usually have a single
provider)
5) Customer ASes. (8852 ASes. Stubs - end consumers)
It is natural to ask just how much power the central ASes
of the Internet have. In this regard, our paper looks into the
following research questions.
• What are the “backbone” ASes of the Internet, and how
effective are they at capturing Internet traffic?
– The study by Rexford et al is fifteen years old; in
this time, the Internet has grown from 10,000 ASes
to 55,000. How many backbone ASes are there in
the current Internet?
– Are the “backbone” ASes specifically those with no
providers (Tier 1), or are other ASes better able to
capture traffic?
• How much impact do censorious countries have, on the
functioning of the Internet?
– Are any backbone ASes located in censorious countries? Could they in fact be filtering traffic to other
countries?
– How much collateral damage can censor countries
inflict on “downstream” ASes in other countries
(who are technically outside their jurisdiction)?
We note that these questions about the structure of the
Internet have important practical implications. Open access to
the Internet is an exceptionally powerful resource, and plays
a political role in the world; for this reason, free access to
information online has been declared a human right by the
United Nations [4]. However, there is a tension between free
speech and keeping the commons safe. Several Governments
- notably China, Russia, Cuba etc. and also some notable
democracies such as India, South Africa, and Indonesia, have
expressed concern about the open Internet. 1 This concern may
be benevolent, e.g. policing child pornography; but there is
precedent where State control of communication channels has
been abused to silence the opposition. We suggest that, if in
fact the power to monitor or filter all Internet traffic lies in
the hands of a few major companies, this may be a cause for
concern.
We begin our study with some discussion of background
and related work, in the next section.
1 Kyrgyzstan opposes declaring access to information online as a human
right. Bangladesh, Congo, and Kenya are opposed to free speech online as
a human right. Bolivia, Burundi, China, Cuba, Ecuador, India, Indonesia,
Kyrgyzstan, Qatar, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, United
Arab Emirates, Venezuela, and Vietnam are opposed to both[5].

2

II. BACKGROUND AND R ELATED W ORK

III. A PPROACH AND M ETHODS

There are two bodies of work related to the current paper.
The first involves the study of censorship and how it is implemented in various countries around the world. The second is
the study of Internet mapping, or more precisely, determining
the routes taken by Internet traffic. We discuss both of these
areas briefly in this section.

Our primary question, in this paper, is whether a small set
of Autonomous Systems actually route all or nearly all of the
traffic in the Internet - and if so, to identify these ASes. A
high-level overview of our approach is as follows.
1) Collect BGP-level routes in the Internet, to a large set of
important targets (such as Google, Facebook, Amazon
etc.) and construct an AS-level map of the routes.
2) Identify the heavy-hitter ASes on the map, which appear
on a large fraction (nearly all) of the traces.
3) Repeat the experiment with different sets of target sites,
to check that the given heavy hitters are general, and not
an artifact of the chosen list of target sites.
It is natural to question why we do not directly map the
traffic-heavy paths of the Internet. Unfortunately, direct information about the magnitudes of traffic flows is not publicly
available. We believe we get a good approximation from
mapping the paths to the most popular websites. This approach
does have vulnerabilities - it is quite possible that, for example,
we choose the Alexa top-100 websites for our study, and the
map we construct is completely different than for the top200 or some other equally valid set. In order to guard against
such a possibility, we perform cross-validation by repeating
the experiment with multiple target sets.
We now provide the details of our method.

A. Internet Censorship
Government censorship of the Internet was systematically
studied by Zittrain [6], in his seminal analysis of filtering
by the People’s Republic of China. Important early studies
were then contributed by Deibert [7], Wolfgarten [8], and
Dornseif [9], who describe not only censorship policy but also
mechanism of filtering as well as anti-censorship measures.
Work in the area has since focused on either determining
exactly which content is blocked in a given country (i.e.
policy) or how such blocking is performed (mechanism).
In the area of policy, several authors have explored the
censorship in single countries such as China [10], Iran [11],
Pakistan [12] etc.; Verkamp et al [13] extend this with a survey
of censorship across eleven countries. Several projects provide
tools to determine censorship policy: ConceptDoppler [14],
HerdictWeb [15], CensMon [16], and Encore [17].
Studies of mechanism show a steady increase in the sophistication of both censorship and anti-censorship, from the
early work of Clayton [18] (TCP reset) and Park [19] (HTML
response filtering) to the complex arsenal used by China to
block Tor, reported by Winter [20]. Our work, in particular, is
strongly influenced by two papers in this group: Levis [21],
who raised concerns that collateral damage can be caused
by the Internet filtering in a nation, and Shmatikov et al [1],
who describe the costs of trying to avoid a particular AS.
It is natural to ask, if a randomly-chosen AS has so much
power, how hard it is to avoid a “backbone” AS as reported
by Rexford [3], and also how much collateral damage is in
fact being caused by the censorious nations that host one or
more backbone ASes. We explore both these questions in this
paper.
B. Internet Mapping
Our work draws heavily on the construction of a map of
routes in the Internet. The early work in this area, such as
by Govindan [22], Willinger [23], and Shavitt [24], rely on
discovering router-level maps using the tool Traceroute, and
then use heuristics to deduce ASes and their connections.
However, we make use of the algorithm by Gao [25], which
directly computes AS-level paths using public BGP routing
data collected by Routeviews [26].
More recently, Claffy [27] and Giotsas [28] have demonstrated improved methods of Internet mapping, which are very
accurate in deducing AS relationships (provider-customer,
peer-peer). We have therefore taken the relationships they
compute and used this information in finding routes in the
Internet with Gao’s algorithm.

A. Mapping the Internet
As discussed in the previous section, there are two principal
methods of mapping the Internet. The first method, as used
by tools such as CAIDA’s Archipelago [], involves the active
measurement of the network using traceroute etc. Probes are
sent along various paths, and the hop-by-hop path is computed,
then abstracted to AS-level resolution. The second method is to
collect publicly-available routing information, from the BGP
announcements of ASes, and to collate these routes to produce
maps of the Internet.
In this paper, we have adopted the second method. We build
an AS-level Internet map, using the paths connecting popular
WWW destinations and the various ASes of the Internet.
Our original map uses the top-100 most popular websites
(as reported by Alexa) as the target WWW destinations; we
then perform cross-validation, to check that our results are
not an artifact of these sites (as discussed in detail later in this
section).
For AS-level path inference, we employ the end-to-end
algorithm by Gao [25], which estimates paths from a given
IP or IP-prefix to every AS in the Internet. The inputs to the
algorithm are existing BGP RIBs; we use the BGP routing
tables collected by the RouteViews project [26] from Internet
Exchange Points (IXes), where several ASes peer and advertise
their available routes.
Paths directly obtained from RIBs are termed sure paths.
ASes on sure paths are called Base ASes. For example, in the
(hypothetical) path 2869 − 3586 − 49561 − 58556 − 10348
192.168.1.12/24, each number represents an AS. The path
originates at AS2869 and terminates at AS10348, the home
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To address this concern, we repeated our experiment for various target sets (Alexa top-10, top-20, top-30 ... top-200 sites)
to see if our results remained stable. Finally, we performed
direct cross-validation by computing heavy-hitter ASes from
paths to one set of sites (Alexa Top-100) and checking whether
they cover over 90% of paths to a different, disjoint set (Alexa
ranks 101 to 225).
In this context, we should also consider why we did not
simply use our algorithm to plot paths from every AS to
every other AS in the world. The reason is that over 85% of
the Internet consists of eyeball ASes, who primarily consume
content from a small number of providers; the overwhelming
majority of computed paths in such an all-to-all map would
see almost no traffic. Our map of paths from all ASes to
important destinations, in contrast, gives a reasonable picture
of the actual paths taken by traffic.
IV. E XPERIMENTAL R ESULTS
In this section, we present our experimental results. First,
we consider the map constructed with paths to our original
sample, the Alexa top-100 test sites. We then check whether
our results remain unchanged as we vary the set of target sites
in our test.
A. Test 1 : Alexa Top-100
1600000
1400000
No. of paths intercepted

AS of the advertised prefix 192.168.1.12/24. Note that the
suffixes of sure paths are themselves also sure paths.
In addition to sure paths, the algorithm computes new
ones. This is done by extending sure paths to other ASes to
which there are no explicitly-known paths (from the prefix
concerned). The extended path must be loop-free, and must
satisfy the Valley-Free Property [25]. The process is as follows.
• For each prefix, all sure paths (containing all the base
ASes) are selected. (These are simply the RIB entries
corresponding to the input prefix).
Next, these sure paths are to be inspected for possible
extension to new ASes, provided they they satisfy the
Valley Free property and have no loops.
• The algorithm searches for ASes that share valid business
relations with the current end ASes of paths. [Rather
than attempt to infer relationships, we directly used the
relationships presented by CAIDA [29].]
• One edge is chosen. It is simply assumed that this edge
extends the given sure path by one hop.
Note that we are trying to find a path from an AS to the
target prefix, and that extensions of several sure paths
might connect the chosen AS to the prefix. Hence there
is a need for tie breaking.
– The algorithm sorts the possible paths, and selects
the shortest path to the prefix.
– In case of a tie, the path with minimum uncertainty
(length of the inferred path extensions) is chosen.
– If there is still a tie, the path with the higher
frequency index (the number of times a sure path
actually appears in the RIBs) is selected.
• The frequency with which the chosen edge appears in the
RIBs, the uncertainty of the extended path, and the new
path length, are updated.

1200000
1000000
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400000
200000

B. Identifying ASes of interest
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The most important question regarding our study, is how
general its results are. If for example, we find that a small set
of “key” ASes dominate routing in the Internet, can we trust
this claim, or is it only true for routes to our sample of target
sites (Alexa Top-100)?
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Fig. 1. Paths to Alexa top-100 sites captured by ASes
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No. of ASes

Paths Intercepted

To select ASes of interest from our map of Internet paths, we
take a greedy approach. Ranking the ASes by path frequency
(i.e. how frequently an AS appears on the paths in the graph),
we keep selecting the most-frequent ASes until we achieve a
desired level of coverage. We choose 90% coverage as our
target - i.e. we select enough ASes to give us a cover of at
least 90% of the paths in the graph.
It may be questioned here why we do not follow the
standard approach of CAIDA [29], where the “importance”
of an AS is determined by its customer-cone size (the total
number of its customers, customers of customers, etc.) In
Section V, we show that in fact customer cone size is a poor
predictor of path frequency - the actual metric of our interest
- and explain why this is so.
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AS Rank

Fig. 2. Paths to one example target site (facebook.com) captured by ASes

The most important result we observe is that the frequency
with which heavy-hitter ASes appear on paths is remarkably
top-heavy, not only for our entire sample of test sites as an
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ASN
3356
174
2914
1299
3257
6939
6461
6453
7018
10310
4134*
3549
4837*
209
9002
6762*
8359*
2828
20485*
16509
9498*
4323
3216*
2497
701
12956
37100
4826*
12389*
1335

aggregate, but even for the individual sites tested (Figures 3
and 4).
The highest-ranked AS, AS3356 (Level 3 Communications),
intercepts 1, 492, 079 paths (≈ 33% of total paths).2 The next
highest, AS174 (Cogent Communications), intercepts 536, 752
more paths (not counting overlaps, i.e. paths intercepted by
both). Together, AS3356 and AS174 intercept 2, 028, 831(=
1, 492, 079 + 536, 752) unique IP-prefix-to-AS paths, i.e.,
about ≈ 45% of all the paths. Proceeding similarly, we see
that the top 30-ASes by path frequency together intercept
92.4% of all paths. The complete list is presented in Table
II; as is clearly visible, nearly a third of these key ASes lie in
censorious countries. (If we include AS 6453, Tata America which, while headquartered in the US, actually belongs to an
Indian company - exactly one-third of the 30 “key” ASes lies
in a censorious country.)
As may be expected, out of the censorious countries, the
ones with backbone ASes - Russia (11.09% of world paths)
and China (7.39% of world paths), as also India (3.08% of
world paths) - cover a substantial fraction of the paths in the
Internet. 3 This is still much smaller than the U.S. (81.82% of
world paths), but overall censorious nations control 20.73%
of the paths in the Internet.

RU
CN
IN
IR
SA
VE
EG
PK
BH

Fraction of total
paths intercepted
11.09%
7.39%
3.08%
0.69%
0.23%
0.16%
0.12%
0.14%
0.04%
TABLE I

Rank (Pfreq)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

Rank (Csize)
1
2
5
4
3
13
8
52
17
6
10
79
85
19
97
7
22
30
21
9
18
16
99
15
12
65
23
26
67
92

TABLE II
T HE 30 “ KEY ” AS ES , WHICH INTERCEPT MORE THAN 90% OF PATHS .
ASes headquartered in censorious nations highlighted.
1.0

0.9

CDF (Paths Intercepted)

Country

Country
US
US
US
SE
DE
US
US
US
US
US
CN
US
CN
US
UA
IT
RU
US
RU
US
IN
US
RU
JP
US
ES
MU
AU
RU
US

0.8
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B. Cross-Validation
0

C. Collateral Damage
As our final experiment, we considered some of the known
censorious ASes and computed the number of customer AS
2 Even

this figure underestimates the influence of the company, as another
of the 30 key ASes - AS 3549, i.e. Global Crossing - belongs to Level 3.
3 In comparison, other censorious nations have much less impact: Iran covers
0.69%, Saudi Arabia 0.23%, and Venezuela, Egypt and Pakistan less than
0.15% each.
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Fig. 3. Cum. freq.: Paths to Alexa top-100 sites captured by key ASes
1.0

0.9

CDF (Paths Intercepted)

In order to verify the generality of our results, we repeated
our experiment for various target sets (Alexa top-10, top-20,
top-30 ... top-200 sites). In each case we found the same ASes
cover ≈ 90% of paths. Further, the key ASes computed using
the Alexa top-100, also capture over 90% of paths to the
websites ranked 101 to 225. [We add in passing that we also
tested how well our “key” ASes covered paths to the 50 most
popular non-domestic websites in China, Iran, and Pakistan;
they covered > 90% of these paths as well.]
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Fig. 4. Cum. freq.: Paths to Alexa sites 101 - 225 captured by the same ASes

5

c2p links

A

paths which are subject to the censorship policy of the AS.
The fraction of traffic that experiences collateral damage from
filtering by some sample censorious nations is presented in
Figure 5.

p2p links

B

C

92.25

D

84.6

E

F

G

Collateral damage(%)

80

Fig. 6. Schematic AS graph. A is “root” of customer cone.
60

A. Backbone vs Tier-1 ASes

44.23

42.43

From our results in the previous section, it is clear that an
overwhelming majority of Internet traffic in our tests (well
over 90%) does in fact pass through one or more of a small
set of backbone ASes. This would imply that these ASes have
the power to set de facto censorship policy, and monitor or
filter Internet traffic worldwide.
The most important question regarding our work, is how we
can claim that this picture is true for Internet traffic in general,
and not an artifact of our methodology - i.e., that the heavy
hitters for flows to Alexa top-100 sites are also heavy hitters
for flows to any site. We have already discussed our answer
to this question in the previous sections, with a description of
our cross-validation using different sets of target sites. In this
section, we address other questions: we explore our finding
that the “backbone” ASes are not necessarily the “Tier 1”
ASes of the Internet, and end with a mention of how this
paper related to our current and future work in the area.

One of the surprising observations of our paper is that
the “heavy hitters” of the Internet not only form a small
core, but the size of the core is not much larger than the 20
ASes reported by Rexford, despite the dramatic growth of the
Internet in the intervening fifteen years [3].
Another, and perhaps equally surprising, fact is that the
backbone ASes we identify are not necessarily Tier-1 ASes
(defined as those with only peering relationships, and no
providers). For example, our list includes the major Tier2 ASes Cogent Communications (AS 174) and Hurricane
Electric (AS 6939), as well as the ChinaNet backbone (AS
4134 and AS 4837), RosTelecom (AS 12389), Yahoo! (AS
10310) etc. which are not only Tier-2 but have Tier-2 providers
(Cogent (AS 174) is a provider to RosTelecom, nLayer
Communications (AS 4436) to the ChinaNet backbone, and
Hurricane Electric (AS 6939) to Yahoo!) We did not, however,
observe any Tier-3 ASes5 . On the other hand, our list does not
include five of the sixteen Tier-1 ASes, specifically Deutsche
Telekom AG (AS 3320), KPN International (AS 286), Orange
(AS 5511), Liberty Global (AS 6830), and Sprint (AS 1239).
We therefore find that the assumption that Tier-1 ASes are
the heavy-hitters of Internet traffic, is not quite true; there is
certainly a strong positive correlation between being Tier-1
and being a “key AS” of the Internet - by which we mean
an AS able to intercept most Internet traffic - but it is neither
necessary, nor sufficient.
Next, we observed that while many of the ASes on our
list were in fact Tier-2, they were very highly ranked by
CAIDA [29] in terms of Customer Cone size. This naturally
raised the question of whether perhaps a composite feature
- Tier-1 or large customer cone - would predict if an AS is
in fact a key AS w.r.t. intercepting Internet traffic. However,
there are counter examples for this as well, such as RETN
(AS 9002) and SOVAM (AS 3216).
We then experimentally checked whether customer cone
size is a good predictor of path frequency. Our results were
very surprising: in fact, among our key ASes, the Spearman’s
Rank Correlation Coefficient between cone size and path
frequency is only ≈ 0.2. We believe the explanation for
this result comes from the existence of non-root paths in a
customer cone, which we now explain with the help of Figure
6.

4 Out of these, 362 paths originated at a Chinese AS, passed through nonChinese ASes, then re-entered China and passed through one or more Chinese
ASes, before finally leaving for its destination.

5 The customers of Tier-2 ASes are mostly still Tier-2 rather than Tier-3.
The term Tier-3 is used to refer to ASes not in the Internet core, i.e., which
do not have peering relationships with Tier-1 or Tier-2 ASes.
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Countries
Fig. 5. Ratio of collateral damage (paths filtered that the country does not have
jurisdiction over) to intentional damage (paths filtered that actually originate
in the country), expressed as a percentage.

The histograms represent the ratio of collateral damage - the
paths that transit or originate in ASes outside the censorious
nations, before passing through the ASes hosted within these
nations - to the actual paths originating inside these nations,
i.e. are the intended targets of filtering. For example, in case
of China, 306, 874 AS paths visited or originated from an
AS outside China4 This constitutes approx. 92.25% of the
332, 742 paths from Chinese ASes to the popular destinations.
And in case of India, 121, 931 paths transiting India suffer
collateral damage compared to 186, 679 paths originating in
the country. In comparison, Russia shows relatively little
collateral damage; the paths passing through Russian ASes
mostly originate in Russia itself.
V. D ISCUSSION AND F UTURE W ORK
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c2p
p2p
AS Y

AS Z

AS X

large cone sizes (preferring to pass through their customer
ASes instead). However, for ASes with smaller customercones, we observed fewer such non-root paths (possibly because an AS in a small cone tends to have fewer peers to route
through). We may perform a more extensive analysis of such
behavior in future work.

AS3356

B. Current and Future Work

AS2818
Bbc.com

AS7015

AS9002
AS6363

AS29226
AS51971

Fig. 7. Valley free paths in the cone of AS3356. Green line: network path
that traverses AS3356 to reach AS2818 directly. Red lines: network paths that
traverse the one-hop customers of AS3356, but not AS3356 itself.

The figure represents a hypothetical AS graph where node
A is the “root” AS. A has the highest customer-cone size
in this figure (6 ASes - D, B, E, F, C, G).6 ASes B and C
have customer cones of size 2. Many valid (valley-free) paths
- such as D − B − E, D − B − C − F , D − B − C − G,
D − B − A − C − F , D − B − A − C − G, E − B − A − C − F
and E − B − A − C − G - do not pass through the root AS,
i.e. the node with the highest customer-cone size.
Our map of the Internet shows that this is indeed a common
phenomenon. For example, 34.16% of the paths to top-100
IP prefixes traverse the AS with the largest customer cone,
AS3356 (cone size = 24, 553). But nearly as many paths,
33.17%, prefer to pass through its 1-hop (immediate) customers. For example - as we see in Figure 7, the traffic through
AS9002 to AS2818 (www.bbc.co.uk) does not pass through
AS3356, though it is the provider to both these ASes. Still
more paths pass through n-hop customers of root ASes (i.e.
customers of customers, and so on.) As a result, customercone sizes and AS path frequencies are not well correlated.
ASN

3356
174
2914
1299
3257
6939
6461
6453
7018
10310

% of path
not reaching
the AS
34.16
29.05
28.16
36.50
21.00
7.46
5.13
26.00
7.40
0.07
TABLE III

% of path
reaching
the AS
33.17
13.13
12.90
8.05
5.23
4.40
4.03
3.76
3.70
3.52

F RACTION OF TRAFFIC PATHS IN A CUSTOMER CONE TRAVERSING LARGE
“ ROOT ” AS, VS FRACTION TRAVERSING 1- HOP CUSTOMERS INSTEAD .

We conclude that path frequency is not as strongly correlated with customer cone size as we expected, owing to the
considerable fraction of paths which do not transit ASes with
6 The customer cone consists of all the ASes that A can reach via its
customers, their customers, etc.

The primary idea that motivates this work is to map the
Internet, and determine which entities (companies and governments) hold the strategic “high ground” of cyberspace. We
are currently exploring this research direction in two other
works:
• It seems to be very difficult for a country to route its
traffic in a way that avoids the backbone of the Internet.
Instead of considering this as a threat, as we do in this
paper, could we perhaps make good use of it? In our study
of Decoy Routing[omitted for review], an anti-censorship
technique that re-purposes smart routers as proxies, we
examine this complementary perspective.
• The largest nation on the Internet by users, China, is
highly censorious. India, the second-largest, is rapidly
becoming censorious as well. If in future a Great Firewall
of India is built along the same lines as the Great Firewall
of China, what might it look like, and what mechanisms
might it employ? We study this question in our submitted
paper[omitted for review].
Our results indicate that routing in the Internet is indeed
dominated by a few heavy hitters, who therefore enjoy a
surprising amount of power. However, several other players in
the current Internet economy may also be considered “central”
to the Web - the major websites themselves (especially the
ones who serve as a platform - most prominently Google and
Amazon); root DNS servers; and the major Internet Exchanges
(DE-CIX, AMS-IX, LINX, IX.br, DATA-IX and MSK-IX,
NL-IX, Equinix, etc.) The general question, “who holds the
high ground,” is thus just as complicated for cyberspace as for
the physical world. (The question is very similar to asking: is
it the player who controls oil wells who is in a strong strategic
position? Or the one with the critical ports on trade routes?)
We intend to explore this research direction in detail, in the
course of our future work.
VI. C ONCLUDING R EMARKS
The organic growth of the Internet has led to a structure
that concentrates substantial routing power in a small number of companies. The first contribution of our paper is to
experimentally validate this “folk wisdom” and demonstrate
that it still holds true even though the Internet has grown and
expanded dramatically in the fifteen years since it was first
discovered [3]. Our work also turns up two surprises. The
first is that the “key” ASes of the Internet, who carry the
overwhelming majority of traffic, are not identical to the Tier1 ASes as we expected. The second is that path frequency and
customer cone-size are poorly correlated, and perhaps peering
links explain the reason for this.
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However, the main contribution of our paper is to draw
attention to the potential for censorship in this top-heavy
structure. A third of the 30 key ASes that form the backbone
of the Internet lie in censorious countries, and they cover
over 20% of the Internet paths in our tests. Further, from
direct examination we see that censorious countries filter (and
possibly also monitor) a substantial fraction of traffic from
other countries. (In particular, we provide direct figures for
China and India.)
We conclude that while it is certainly understandable that
the more powerful routing companies successfully increase
their influence over time, perhaps such centralization is effectively making the Internet more fragile as it leads to a small
number of “throats to choke”. We will pursue this direction
further in our future work.
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